The four destroyers of the Canadian Armed Forces DDH 280 Class have, since commissioning, accumulated a diverse spectrum of operational experience in widely varied geographical theatres ranging from the Tropics to the Arctic and from the Western Atlantic to the Mediterranean. A technical narrative is presented that confirms the original decision to opt for gas turbine propulsion and discusses some of the more significant problems encountered. Areas are highlighted where further system and component development is necessary in the DDH 280 Class in order to maximize the advantages of the aero-derivative gas turbines as a prime mover in our Naval Ships.
Details of the main machinery, associated control systems and the pre-commissioning trials have been described elsewhere (1 -3) 1 , therefore only a brief and cursory description of each will be given here,
The main machinery layout is shown schematically in Fig. 3 . Each shaft line comprises a Pratt and Whitney FT4A boost engine and an FT12 cruise engine driving into a Maag gearbox that incorporates self-synchronizing and shifting clutches. Thrust is transferred from the controllable reversible pitch propeller to the ships structure via a Waukesha combined thrust and plummer bearing. The main engines and gearboxes are raft mounted for noise and vibration isolation.
The plant was designed and is operated on an unattended machinery space concept. Control, from start-up to shutdown, can be exercised either from the Machinery Control Room or from the bridge at an Officer of the Watch Console, as well as locally in the machinery space itself Performance monitoring is carried out automatically with hourly and/or demand data logging. Visual and audio alarms occur if defined operating parameters are exceeded, Electrical power in the ship is supplied by four alternators, three 750-kw units driven by Solar Saturn gas turbines and one 500-kw set driven by a Fairbanks Morse diesel engine. These units may be started remotely from the 1 Numbers in parentheses designate References at end of paper.
MCR or locally at their respective locations in the ship, though paralleling is possible only at the main switchboard. The foregoing provides a very general description of the gas turbine machinery installation, 37,000 Skw (50,000 shp) in a ship displacing approximately 4500 tons.
In retrospect, the precommissioning trials were decidedly uneventful. A combustion problem uncovered during the first of class contractor's sea trials caused a flurry of activity but was quickly resolved, and the trials of the fourth ship progressed so smoothly that the scheduled three weeks of trials were satisfactorily completed in six working days.
Thus, it was adequately demonstrated that with new machinery, and within the visible limits of a precommissioning trials program, the ships' machinery systems met the design intent and performance specification. There is rio test as exacting as time, and this paper reports on actual experience to September 1, 1974 . Commissioning dates for the four ships are given in Table 1 along with total engine hours, representing 2155 commissioned days. During this period, the ships have suffered three FT12 failures requiring engine replacement (all due to the ingestion of foreign objects) and 21 Solar Saturn failures requiring engine replacement. No ship has failed to meet a scheduled sailing date due to non-availability of main engines or generators, and ship availability has remained continually in excess of operational demand. At sea the ships have operated from the Tropics to the Arctic in a broad spectrum of sea states and ambient temperatures, Histograms of this experience are shown in Figs. 4, 5, and 6.
To date, the operational patterns of these ships have been influenced, to a large extent, by the lengthy sequences of onboard systems tests, trials and evaluations that are normal with any 
SOME INTERESTING FAILURES
Failures of components and equipments in service can almost invariably be traced back to either inappropriate or inadequate specification of the requirement by the buyer, or, to lack of appreciation of the specification by the designer. In this context then, it is of interest and import for all concerned to look closely at failures, determine their root cause, correct them, and take steps to ensure that similar deficiencies do not occur in the future.
This section of the paper describes an assortment of failures that have been experienced to date which are of general interest to both suppliers and users of gas turbines, and of particular interest to those who conduct their business off a cold littoral,
Saturn Driven Alternators
Solar Saturn gas turbines, fitted with ball and roller bearings in lieu of the more normal journal bearings, drive three 750-kw alternators for both base load and emergency operation.
Experience with the Solar Saturn engines in the Canadian Forces prior to the commissioning of the DDH 280 Class had been limited to emergency generator applications in the Operational Support Ships. In this application, service experience had been excellent and our expectation for satisfactory performance was high,
In the DDH 280 Class, the engine mounting system is different, the ducting geometry is different, the packaging of the engine auxiliaries is different, and different was our initial experience. Reasons for removal of gas turbines are categorized graphically in Fig. 7 which identifies distinct groups of problems.
Compressor Front Bearing Failures
The first failure occurred in DDH 282, shortly after commissioning, during passage from the shipbuilder's yard to Halifax. Several months later, a similar bearing failure occurred in DDH 281. Discussions with Solar revealed that the bearing clearances and tolerances were such that during cold weather operation, the bearing rollers were probably being pinched during start-up. It was recognized that this was a class problem and all engines were opened up for examination of the front bearing. It was discovered that the front bearings on all three Saturns fitted in DDH 280 had failed ( Fig. 8) . A campaign change was introduced to change the front bearing and bearing support retainer on all engines to a revised manufacturer's design, A side effect of this front bearing failure was contamination of the entire lub oil system (via the filter bypass) necessitating the removal of these engines. Subsequently, the bypass on the lub oil filter has been plugged, and modifications are being made to fit duplex filters, Since the bearing change, no further failures occurred until Fig, 3 Machinery arrangement -niain level July 1974 when an engine failed at 2900 hr. that the double race bearings be replaced by Examination revealed that this failure occurred single bearings, and this is being done as engines as a consequence of the failure of another are returned for repair and overhaul. Evidence component, now suggests that the problem had as its root cause hot misalignment of the engine as described Thrust Bearing Failures in the following, No sooner was the first problem resolved than a second manifested itself one step further Hot Misalignment of Engines back in the engine at the thrust bearing. Ten
During the investigation into possible causes engines failed and were removed while this problem of thrust bearing failures, it was discovered was being investigated and finally resolved, that the bellows fitted between the engine exhaust Originally, the engines were fitted with double scroll and the enclosure panel was excessively race bearings, and it was postulated initially stiff and was distorting the engine under running that the problem was one of inadequate load sharing conditions. Action was taken to free the bellows between each race. The manufacturer recommended by loosening the connection at the enclosure to Discussions with other users have revealed that, even with clean air and burning aviation kerosene, a major increase in time between fuel nozzle cleaning could not be expected. In spite of a current achieved manifold replacement interval of 1000 hr, it has been decided to replace the existing design with a new Solar fuel manifold and nozzle arrangement on several engines on a trial basis. The new fuel nozzles should be less subject to plugging because of the larger nozzle diameter. Also, the maintenance workload 
Starter Failures
The starter duty for the gas turbine driven alternators is an arduous one, requiring the alternator to be brought on load in 15 sec from the stopped and cold condition, with no electrical supply available in the ship. This cycle is required to be capable of repetition six times without recharging the starter system, The engine manufacturer selected a start system was overcome by waterwashing with the engine being motored by the starter. The second shortcoming involved re-engagement of the starter caused by the air start control valve failing to close at the end of the start cycle and the engine being-shut down while the starter was still running. Under these conditions, the starter clutch re-engages and a rather spectacular demolition of the starter internal gear ensues. Thirdly, shearing of the starter output shaft has often occurred due to excessive starting torques. This is thought to be a function of both system capacitance resulting in high pressure pulses appearing at the starter, and unstable operation of the control valve aggravated by moisture in the air supply. Investigations are in hand and tests are being conducted with an alternative control valve which, it is expected, will alleviate both the latter shortcomings.
Propulsion Engines
Post-commissioning experience with the propulsion engines has been most satisfactory, though this statement must be tempered by recording the total engine hours accumulated to date (Table 1) , Defects occurring have all been of a readily soluble nature.
FT12 Foreign Object Damage
Three FT12's have been removed because of foreign object damage. The foreign objects will be reduced considerably since removal of the nozzles and manifold will not require removal of combustion chamber components.
Accessory Drive and Transfer Gearcase Failures
The transfer gearcase has experienced a number of bearing failures due to seizure of the spline drive between the compressor rotor and the pinion. This allowed axial vibration of the compressor rotor to be transmitted to the bearings. Two modifications have been made: one to improve lubrication of the splines, the other to shorten the splined shaft between the compressor rotor and the pinion, as a review of possible tolerance stack-up had shown that there could be axial interference. consisted of pieces of building debris and possibly rivets which had come loose in the downtakes, These experiences have provided an expensive lesson on the cost-effectiveness of cleanliness. The extent of the damage is unknown because the engines have not been stripped for examination to date; however, it is felt that damage, in the form of nicks and dents, is confined to the first three stages of the compressor blading. (There are no boroscope openings on the compressor casing to allow thorough inspection of all compressor stages.) It should be noted that there is no plenum chamber in the air intake system for the FT12. The passage is smooth and unobstructed, and any material entering the ducting will probably be ingested by the engine. The FT4 downtake has a plenum chamber immediately forward of the engine inlet, and this provides an opportunity for foreign objects to collect in the plenum rather than be drawn directly into the engine.
FT12 Combustor Cans and Nozzles
In a previous paper (3), the problem with the FT12 combustor cans and nozzles was described. The initial combustor can/nozzle configuration achieved a life of approximately 40 hr. After fitting of the new combustor can and nozzles, selected inspections have allowed the hot section inspection interval to be tentatively set at 1500 effective hours. In practice, this turns out to be approximately 1200 actual hours, The fuel manifold and nozzle assemblies are returned to the manufacturer at this time for overhaul, During a hot section inspection on a Port FT12, it was found necessary to replace six first-stage turbine vanes because of excessive bowing, This has been attributed to several hot starts on this engine resulting from incomplete fuel drainage on engine shutdown. A combustor can was replaced on this engine because of cracks. Figs. 9 and 10 are photographs of one of the bowed vanes and the cracked combustion chamber, Replacement of a single first-stage turbine vane was also required on another engine. (Curiously, this same vane had to be replaced again dzring a subsequent hot section inspection.)
WASTE HEAT RECOVERY
A design philosophy leading to integrated auxiliary machinery systems has already been well described (4) . In order to justify the use of gas turbine driven alternators with a relatively high specific fuel consumption (compared with diesel engines?, waste heat recovery is necessary to achieve acceptable system thermal efficiencies. In the DDH 280 Class, heat is recovered in the form of steam for ship's service applications by two waste heat boilers. These boilers are in parallel with two oil-fired auxiliary boilers to achieve the desired level of sub system redundancy and to allow for maintenance and repair.
"The decision to install dissimilar type components (non-standardization) resulted in an auxiliary power system that provides tremendous flexibility, reliability and availability in addition to reducing technical risks" (4),
The foregoing statement has indeed proved to be most significant. Adequate steam has been available to meet all ship requirements in spite of the temporary decommissioning of the waste heat boilers in all but one ship. That there was technical risk involved in the utilization of a radical waste heat boiler design there is no doubt, but their non-availability has not prevented the overall system meeting all necessary requirements. The non-availability of the waste heat boiler system results in large part from the severe constraints that were placed on the volumetric configuration and weight of the system, and the resultant very compact, heavily loaded core design, achieves a steam production -rate of 2720 kg/hr (6000 lb/hr) at 0.345 MPa (50 psi). Fig. 11 shows one of the pair of elements fitted in each unit. The output was proved under the clinical conditions of the manufacturer's test house, where the gas turbine exhaust was simulated by a natural gas burner, and was repeated during the short duration performance and acceptance trial at the Naval Engineering Test Establishment (NETS), in Montreal. During operation at sea, however, it rapidly became apparent that a number of practical problems existed in the system. The more significant of these were
Steam Pressure Control
Due to its limited turndown, the auxiliary boiler cycled on and off at certain critical loads causing an instability in the system steam pressure. The effect of this, although small in itself, was sufficient to cause the flash evaporators to become unstable due to erratic performance of the ejectors,
Steam Generation in Full Bypass Mode
When the waste heat boiler is on full bypass, there is sufficient heat radiation through the diverter louvers such that, in conjunction with convection on the downstream side of the core, a significant generation of steam occurs causing the relief valves to lift.
Corrosion and Plugging of the Heat Transfer Core
On the water side, plugging was caused by the use of inadequately treated shore water, The situation was aggravated by the fact that a commcn feed tank supplies two fundamentally different types of boiler, one a recirculating (the waste heat) boiler and the other a once-through (the auxiliary) boiler. Sludge, precipitated by the treatment, associated with a low P-alkalinity and high oxygen content generated the problem. Externally, the blocking of the gas passages may be attributed to the soot content of the gas turbine exhaust, an ineffective soot blowing system at the boiler core, and tight tube fin spacing. Furthermore, a leaking header gasket accelerated corrosion of the chrome clad mild steel fins in one instance (Fig. 12 ) aggravating the problem of gas path blockage and precipitating a product improvement program slated to come to fruition in August 1975. Contributory factors to the high exhaust gas carbon content may well have been fuel contamination, re-ingestion of synthetic lub oil vapor from a tank vent, and fouling of fuel nozzles,
The product improvement program introduced to overcome these problems includes:
1 Modification of the control logic such that modulation occurs on the waste heat boiler during the period that the oil-fired boiler is at maximum turndown. (A small decrease in system efficiency will be accepted,) 2 Utilization of existing drain cooler capacity to accept excess steam from bypassed units. The main and cruise gas turbine inlet air demisters are of the single-stage polypropylene knitted mesh type arranged to face outboard and aft. A manually operated bypass if fitted should the demisters become blocked for any reason. Operation is effected if the inlet depression across the demisters exceeds a pre-determined value. It is acknowledged that this is a "first generation" intake design and its performance is being assessed in relation to compressor fouling and hot section corrosion. To date, no significant corrosion problem has been observed in spite of there being evidence of solid salt buildup in the downtakes, Daily water washing of compressors is carried out using detergent washing as required. Washing of demister pads is an occasional routine. The salt contamination is of more concern in the FT12 which is operated near the top end of its power range for comparatively long periods in order to conserve fuel. The FT4 engine spends comparatively little time at high power, and, therefore, hot section corrosion is minimized. A program is currently in hand to measure the salt contamination of the air at three positions: on deck, downstream of the demisters, and at the engine inlet, Readings are taken with due regard to engine power, ship's course and speed, atmospheric pressure, humidity and temperature, wind velocity, wind direction and sea state. Results recorded to date have not, however, been readily correlated to the pertinent ambient conditions or the observed buildup of salt on the downtake sides.
Finally, the adoption of the ship structure to form the downtake bulkheads has lead to some problems of noise in adjacent mess decks, and
The solution adopted was to move the coolers and modifications are In hand to reduce noise transreservoirs out of the enclosure into the machinery mission further. room. Since there was a need to improve access to the machine for servicing, this moving of COLD WEATHER OPERATION items from the enclosure seemed generally preferable to the fitting of a tank heater.
Gas Path Effects
The ships of the class are based in Halifax where winter air temperature and sea temperatures can be very low for prolonged periods, Apart from local heating of the engine inlet surfaces no de-icing system is fitted to the intakes, and, in consequence, there has been concern over the possible blocking of the knitted mesh demisters, Attempts to deliberately seek appropriate weather conditions for an Arctic trial have proved fruitless, ending with the ship returning to harbor having encountered little worse than warm gentle zephyrs and cloudless azure skies. Thus, each ship was issued with instructions to conduct a formal trial if and when adverse winter weather conditions prevailed. Thus, it was that last winter HURON, DDH 281, found herself operating in "arctic smoke" off Halifax and ice formed in the FT12 demisters ( Fig. 13) , causing the pressure differential to rise activating the alarm. The bypass doors were opened, and the ship was able to continue steaming, without pause, but accepting a degradation in engine protection from the effects of salt. To unblock the demisters, it was necessary to seek more favorable weather conditions to allow them to thaw out. Considerably more work is required in this area to 1 Understand the climatic conditions that give rise to blockage. 2 Design a means of thawing blocked demisters. 3 Design economic and effective means of preventing icing while not contributing further to the top weight.
In cold atmospheric conditions, the injection of water for compressor washing can well lead to an icing problem at the gas turbine inlet. The initial solution had been to wash with a water/iso-propyl alcohol mixture, However, the difficulties of handling and storing of this liquid has led to discontinuation of the practice,
Lub Oil Effects
The gas turbine alternator module, as designed, had the lub oil cooler and reservoir inside the enclosure where it was subjected to outside ambient temperatures, and this presented problems on start-up due to excessively cold oil.
HEALTH MONITORING
Health monitoring has been adopted as the sole criterion used to determine the necessity of engine replacement, and specific engine hours to removal have not been declared. This philosophy, though at variance with aircraft practice is considered valid based on the premise that the desired level of system reliability is achieved by redundancy of equipments composing it and that health monitoring will generally provide the lead time necessary to effect timely repair or replacement. To date, it is felt that this position has been justified.
Health monitoring techniques utilized in the DDH 280 Class include vibration analysis, spectrographic oil analysis, performance analysis and boroscopic examination (though the engines were not specifically designed or selected for boroscope inspection).
Vibration Monitoring
An engine installed vibration monitoring system is used for the propulsion gas turbines with read-outs at the operator's console in the MCR. Currently though, due to a very pedestrian setting to work problem, it has been found necessary to back this system up with a system devised by NETS,
The history of vibration analysis on the Solar Saturn engines is, perhaps, of more interest since here we have observed several failures in service. On these engines, accelerometer mounting blocks are fitted at various points, generally in the vicinity of bearings, and readings are taken using portable egµipment on a periodic basis.
Initial attempts to establish absolute vibration acceptance criteria have not been successful due to scatter of readings between engines. This has undoubtedly been influenced by the installation and alignment problems previously discussed, Tracking of level changes with time, however, has proved to be a most useful monitoring tool and, in the thrust bearing failure period, time tracking in the 500-Hz center frequency octave band allowed observation of both deterioration and failure (Fig, 14) .
Spectrographic Oil Analysis
Spectrographic Oil Analysis Programs are run for machinery in all major ships of the Canadjan Armed Forces, including the DDH 280 Class, as an adjunct to other health-monitoring techniques. In the case of the Solar Saturn engines, it has proved useful in the determination of bearing deterioration. It would be fair to say though that our experience to date places spectrographic oil analysis as a method of confirmation of a distress usually indicated by other means.
Boroscopic Examination
The use of boroscopes has been on an "as opportunity permits" basis. They have been found particularly useful in inspecting nozzle tips and cans on the FT4 engines u.sing the igniter plug as an access point. It is felt that considerable time could be saved on maintenance and diagnostic inspection if machinery were to be designed with a boroscope clearly etched into the designer's frontal lobe.
SUPPORT
The measure of success in the operational deployment of a ship to sea is vested in the degree to which she achieves her mission objectives. A large proportion of this achievement will be a direct function of ship system availability at the required time, This availability requires appropriate system specification, design, and execution, and a high degree of reliability. While superficially these factors are fixed when the ship is built, availability is made fact by high standards of maintenance, adequate technical support, and sufficient logistic support and control.
Maintenance
In the Canadian Armed Forces the maintenance levels are defined as follows:
1st Line. Onboard maintenance by ships staff with assistance of the Dockyard and Fleet Maintenance Group. This includes removal of items under the "Repair by Replacement" philosophy for 2nd and 3rd line maintenance.
2nd Line. Equipment removed from the ship, repaired in the Dockyard, and then reinstalled onboard.
3rd Line. Equipment repaired at a manufacturer's or other contractor's plant, usually under a standing contract. The item is replaced onboard by a reconditioned spare and the repaired item is returned to the stores system, Maintenance schedules have been prepared defining the requirements for periodic tests and inspections. The documentation prepared for the contractors trials (3) is being adapted for in service and post-refit testing, tuning, calibrating, and setting to work. The repair policies as applied to individual equipments are kept constantly under review. For example, it has recently been decided that in order to expedite hot section inspections and to minimize "on shelf" holdings and nugatory stripping and reassembly, a fuel manifold spray pattern test facility will be provided in the Dockyard.
Technical Support
It is considered important, particularly during the early years of a new class of ship, that there be a ready response from the equipment suppliers to requests for technical assistance. To this end, Technical Investigation and Engineering Services (TIES) contracts have been placed with the gas turbine suppliers. These contracts reduce administrative delay and, from the manufacturers' viewpoint, facilitate payment for services, Over and above the various TIES contracts, a representative from the Main Machinery Contractor is under full-time contract in the Halifax Dockyard,
Logistic Support
The most vexing problem in this support system is the necessary and urgent updating of the quantities of spare components, subassemblies, and assemblies required to be held in the stores inventory. This situation results from the fact that not only are the initial predictions of the quantities required invariably inaccurate when equipment is either new or of novel configuration, but also, that lead times on the delivery of parts from industry to replace consumed stores have increased dramatically in the past two years. Consequently, there are not infrequent panics either to procure new and repair existing items or, reduce pipeline times to repair equipments. This has become a way of life with new ships, and though not particularly desirable it has, none the less, become accepted. The situation can be expected to improve.
MANPOWER AND TRAINING
In justifying the case for the use of aeroderivative gas turbines in lieu of steam for warship propulsion, one of the more significant claims was the consequential reduction in onboard manpower costs that would accrue, This is achieved by the utilization of repair by replace- 
ment techniques, automatic machinery control and
The proportional increase in numbers in the hull data collection, and the provision of maintenance and electrical trades reflects the introduction assistance to the ship's staff by shore support of "whole ship" air conditioning, electronic organizations.
controls, and the increase in electrically driven A Some comparative figures will be of inter-auxiliary machinery. Our raison d'etre demands est, though definition of a common base is not that the ship be manned to meet all action easy. None the less, Table 2 compare the conditions, and thus it is not always cost engineering branch manning standards for a steam effective to take full advantage of the manpower destroyer [2800 tons, 22,500 Skw (30,000 shp)
, economies that are possible by propulsion system having lim'ted boiler remote control, to the DDH design. One can justifiably say, though, that 280 Class 04500 tons, 37,000 Skw, (50,000 shp)J.
manpower savings have been effected in the DDH 2, v Class In accordance with the cla`...s ::ade f'c_ as turbine propulsion, Successful operation, of scphisticated modern macninery systems demands the h-ghest star:dards of managers, oferators, anal r..ainta`-ne: , s.
Tnus :t is not a cliche tk-say that tree 'an sti=1 rer;iains the most :npertant stngle factor.
Fersi;nnel of the Canadian Armed Forces fc_I a r ram of progressive education, tra`.n.-, and eade_sap development to meet their e f i -t_es at each level. In addiiior_ to this, cj ecific trair:ir , __S given on to : c ac u'._ments and systems, 
CONCLUSIONS
With the conclusion of the program and the entry of the ships into the operational control of the Maritime Commander, it is now possible to reflect a little on the merits of the way In which the ships were configured and equipped.
The case for aero-derivative gas turbines as prime movers in small warships is accepted as proven, though the use of gas turbines with waste heat recovery for base load power generation is not universally acknowledged. Therefore, the choice of the gas turbines for main propulsion and base load generation is not questioned at this juncture, rather, an attempt will be made, on the basis of two years' operational hindsight, to answer the question "If, at this point in time, the ship were to be redesigned, what major design features would or should be changed?"
Four main features are identified:
Propulsion Engine Ducting
The first feature to be identified s the main engine ducting, In the DDH 280 C ass, the ship's structure forms one wall of the main engine inlet duct. While this obviously saved weight, space, and material cost, it also proved extremely difficult for the shipbuilder to d.scharge his responsibility in lining up the machinery to the ducting within the designed tolerances while recognizing normal steel erection tolerances. This dilemma has resulted in aggravating noise leaks from the ducts into living and working spaces in the ship. In consequence, we have been obliged to provide further palliative treatments to the duct over and above the existing noise suppression system. In a rerunning of the program, advantage should be taken of the simplicity of ductwork entirely separated from the ships structure and the penalties of weight and space increases accepted.
Ductwork often nullifies many of the size advantages of the aero-derivative gas turb`_ne in a small warship designed with a direct mechanical dr°_ve confi_ucation, as well as presentinc; the Naval Architect with any structural_ problems, It is tantaizin -to speculate on the possibili ties with m Ines mounted hi;, ,h in the sh?_p, Tot cost and ccr:servatis;: a`:tigate against this sort of activity at this point in time,
Dec sting
The rani z:ications of inef ficler.cy Ii. de,r: -istir.g arrangements when operati ,, in a ma:'ine environment were certainly being learned during the design phases of the DDH 2b0 Class: however, the state of the art at that time only allowed simi e polypropylene "knit mesh" filters to be incorporated. This then is the second feature to be identified. Today, one would consider a more effective system, probably of the threestage configuration, two inertial and one coaiescent. It is none the less interesting to note that the observable effects of salt contamination in the propulsion engines of the class have been minimal. This may be mainly attributable to the fact that in a warship application, operation at or near full power is an uresual occurrence, and thus the number of hours spent at turbine temperatures where serious deleterious effects could be expected, are not large (Fig. 6) ,
Demister blockage by icing is another area of demisting that may warrant further study. One instance has been experienced in a total exposure of 10 "ship winters." It would seem necessary to establish whether or not it is cost-effective to have on line de-icing of the demister core available or whether it is acceptable to continue with the use of the existing configuration of demister bypass doors, Such a study must consider' among other factors:
1 The frequency of occurrence of icing 2 The likely duration of the conditions giving rise to it 5 The prolonged effects of operation with the demisters bypassed 4 The cost, weight, and bulk of various deicing options 5 The power limitation up tohich deicing will be effective relative to prime energy consumed.
Engine Enclosures
The close-fitting enclosures are the third feature to be identified and these, like the curatets egg, are good in parts and bad in parts, They are light, neat, compact and tidy, which is good, however, access to the engines is often difficult and the resealing of the enclosures on boxing up has often presented problems to ships' staffs. Walk in enclosures, now being supplied by most manufacturers, seem to have advantages here. They resolve the problem of accessibility and discourage the naval architect and machinery arranger from eroding the space allocated for engine maintenance and removal during the design process.
Overboard Venting
The final feature to be identified here is that of the method of overboard venting -especially in respect of lubricating oil reservoirs. The problem of siting conventional vents to prevent reingestion under all conditions of ship speed and relative wind seems to be almost insoluble. In the DDH 280 Class, ingestion of oily fumes does occur under certain conditions and gas turbine compressor fouling is obvious and visible -especially in the generator engines. A better venting method would appear to be desirable. One scheme that looks attractive at this point in time is the eduction of vents via a flash screen into the engine exhausts, thus restricting the model tester's nightmare to consideration of funnel plumes and intakes alone.
The conceiving of problems, both real and imaginary, is a facinating and normal game. This is especially so during the design stage at which point they are exceedingly easy to postulate and exceedingly difficult to refute. A large number of these ghosts were laid by two events; the computer simulation of the whole propulsion and control system and the shore testing of one complete shaft line of machinery, with the exception of the propeller. Several minor problem areas in the system were revealed but, more importantly, the validity of the design was confirmed.
It is convenient to conclude the paper on this optimistic note and observe that the DDH 280
Class has, to date, reinforced the initial optimism of our naval engineering designers about the application of as turbines as prime movers in small warships. They yield easily maintained, reliable, and economic installations and further operational experience will, we hope, confirm our optimistic position.
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